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ABSTRACT
The University Nanosatellite Program (UNP) was founded in 1999 as the first government funded program to
mentor university students in the design, integration, and operations of small satellites. UNP Employees have
assisted in the development of over 80 satellites from a number of universities across the country. This paper
presents the lessons learned from UNP's 19-year history of mentoring students in small satellite systems
engineering.
INTRODUCTION
The University Nanosatellite Program (UNP) is a
university-outreach program run out of the Air Force
Research Laboratories (AFRL) at Kirtland Air Force
Base in Albuquerque, NM. The program was founded
in 1999 in order to facilitate small-satellite
development at universities across the United States
and was one of the first government-funded smallsatellite programs.
The UNP office is run by a program coordinator and
a team of systems engineers that continually monitor
the progress of, at times, more than 15 teams in
various phases of the program. Over the years,
differences in the office team infrastructure and
policy have yielded varying results in terms of the
process the students take to achieve the completion of
their satellites. Roles and responsibilities of
employees of the UNP office have changed over the
years as well as the methods employed to teach
systems engineering. Despite these variances in
administration, a number of common themes have
been observed. This paper aims to consolidate these
commonalities into a fixed set of lessons learned for
the benefit of the university small-satellite
community.
The UNP has three main objectives, which are
outlined in Figure 1. The primary objective is to
educate students in best systems engineering practices
in preparation for use in the workforce. Secondarily,
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the program aims to bolster small satellite technology
development for industry and Department of Defense
use. Lastly, the UNP program fosters the
development of university satellite labs by giving
them satellite-development resources and access to
systems engineering training.

Figure 1: UNP Objectives
In order to accomplish these objectives, a rigorous
four-phase program has been developed and refined.
The current organization of the program, shown in
Figure 2, is the result of iterative revisions over the
course of 19 years. The four phases take the students
through the complete satellite mission lifecycle,
beginning with mission conception and requirements
development, continuing through system design and
implementation, and finishing with testing, launch,
and operations. The phases themselves feature
specific reviews that are administered by the program
office and attended by a variety of industry partners
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that participated in the program themselves as
students or are interested in recruiting.

Figure 2: UNP Phases
LESSONS LEARNED
This paper itself was written using inputs solicited
from a wide variety of resources spanning the entire
history of the UNP. Sources include university
principal investigators, past student participants,
industry supporters, and former UNP systems
engineers. These individuals were asked to think of
lessons learned from participating or administering
the program. Responses were collected and sorted
into three categories:
1) Mission Management, i.e., dealing directly
with systems engineering principles;
2) Personnel Management, i.e., dealing with
student and staff support given the
constraints of the university setting;
3) Project Management, i.e., dealing with
timelines and university politics.
Based on the information obtained from this group of
respondents, a common theme emerged: problems
caused by the risk associated with a shortage of
monetary, personnel, and schedule limitations. Some
of this risk can be self-inflicted as a result of common
difficulties associated with a workforce made largely
of university students. Almost all of the lessons
learned discussed in this paper can be traced back to
causes and implications of one of these risks.
Mission Management
The first category of lessons learned is mission
management. The application of systems engineering
to a “real-word” application (i.e., a satellite mission)
for the first time is challenging in any scenario, but
the resource constraints in the university environment
can introduce particular difficulties. By nature,
universities tend to lack stable monetary and
personnel resources because university research
activities are generally funded on a project-by-project
basis and are limited to a largely student workforce.
When attempting to navigate a full space-mission
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lifecycle, this workforce is often overtasked as it
consists entirely of part-time student engineers.
Additionally, the student workforce is by definition
not made up of “career” employees and is thus highly
susceptible to turnover, sometimes as often as every
semester. Such constant turnover creates an urgency
in schedule as the full satellite must be completed
before too much engineering knowledge is lost.
Difficulties caused by resource limitations manifest
themselves throughout the project lifecycle,
beginning with design tasks. In this phase (Phase A in
Figure 2), university teams tend to struggle with a
common set of issues. Firstly, lack of resources limits
the scope of what a university satellite mission can
accomplish. In some cases, the students cannot assess
mission feasibility accurately until too far into the
design process because of inexperience projecting
resource needs. Often, university teams fail to
appropriately take into account the resource
requirements associated with both payload and
spacecraft bus development. In the past, successful
universities have found ways to make some aspect of
spacecraft bus development a mission objective or
levy the development of a main payload on another
entity in order to divide the work and reduce resource
strain. Others are able to design missions that do not
require the development of overly complex systems
in the spacecraft payload or bus. With simpler
mission concepts, mission design and verification
become more achievable in a resource-strained
environment. Proper feasibility studies are also a key
part in determining how much effort will be required
to accomplish proposed mission concepts.
Validation of the mission concept both in terms of
feasibility and design of an appropriate concept of
operations (CONOPs) is another Phase A task in
which problems have been found to arise, this time
somewhat self-inflicted due to lack of experience. If
the mission concept is not developed adequately
during the creation of the mission proposal, mission
success criteria tend to be ill-defined at conception
and may change throughout the development process.
Without firm mission success criteria, it becomes
difficult to develop appropriate requirements. Teams
with ill-defined requirements then struggle to finalize
a mission design and are unable to create verification
and validation plans that reinforce success criteria.
University teams that have spent time developing the
mission concept during the proposal and pre-proposal
stage before the beginning of Phase A are more likely
to be able to move forward in their development
process without having to backtrack due to poor
requirements. These teams have kept design and
verification paths in mind during the development of
the mission concept and CONOPs and do not
encounter as many problems at implementation.
Software development -- from a design standpoint -also leads to difficulties. When teams largely made of
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systems, mechanical, and electrical engineers attempt
to write spacecraft software, they tend to skip design
and immediately try to implement solutions. The
common theme in teams that are able to make it
through both design and verification of their
spacecraft is an understanding of the systemsengineering processes involved in software
development. Proper configuration management,
requirements definition, and verification planning is
necessary for both hardware-related and softwarerelated work. These concepts must be recognized and
applied far before implementation as part of the
definition process. In some cases, teams that do not
complete these tasks early must pause their timelines
in order to equalize progress on software and
hardware. In others, teams attempt to move on to
verification and validation and find that they are
unable to finalize their software due to a continuous
stream of bugs. In general, teams that make it through
Phase B have spent time planning software
infrastructure and design before attempting
implementation.
All three of these risks can be mitigated by planning
vigorously during the first half of spacecraft
development. This requires a greater investment of
time into the first half of the systems engineering
process in order to avoid unnecessary slow-downs in
the second half.
Personnel Management
The next major category that was called out in survey
responses was personnel-related lessons learned. The
primary link between all successful UNP teams is the
right combination and management of personnel.
A number of responses called out common roles that
need to be filled in order to complete a small-satellite
mission. From an interpersonal standpoint, one
reviewer divided the tasks into four major roles1. The
first of these roles is a motivating force behind the
team. This individual is aware of the overall vision
and mission scope and works to spread that vision
across the team and to stakeholders. This role often
delves into the political side of the project and is thus
usually held by the principal investigator of the
mission. The second role is the source of the team’s
momentum. These individuals complete the bulk of
the design and implementation. In order to function
well, they enable each other and the rest of the team
as they complete tasks. The third role is a verification
role. These individuals handle verification of the
implemented design created by others. The last role
requires emotional intelligence and manages the
meshing of the team. These individuals work to
ensure that the team remains cohesive through dayto-day operations. These roles can overlap and can be
carried out by almost any team member. If any of
these roles is not filled, the teams are at risk of
encountering problems that may prevent completion
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of the satellite. The best UNP teams are teams that
feature all four types of team member.
From an engineering standpoint, there are also a wide
variety of technical roles that need to be filled.
Interdisciplinary teams that incorporate electrical,
mechanical, and computer science disciplines in
addition to the more obvious systems and aerospace
disciplines are able to assign tasks to the most
equipped individuals. Teams that feature individuals
with such diverse background skillsets can thereby
reduce the amount of time spent learning specialized
topics during satellite development.
These aspects of personnel management can be
applied to a team in any setting, but there are certain
problems that universities face on larger scales by
virtue of having a predominantly student workforce.
First, recruiting is a large part of personnel
management. Many university teams cannot pay the
student population for their efforts, so many new
recruits (as well as established team members) must
have other motivations for working on the mission
while also completing university coursework. If the
student base is largely unmotivated, the team will
suffer overall. Additionally, turnover is guaranteed in
a university setting, sometimes as often as every
semester. Turnover can significantly lengthen the
timeline of satellite development unless managed
actively and consistently. Teams that enforce a
“deputy” role that shadows the primary lead for at
least a semester for all student leadership positions
are more likely to be able to keep development
continuous and can avoid the re-completion of work.
Project Management
The third and final survey response category is
project management. This section deals largely with
alleviating the shortage of resources and common
risks from which university teams suffer. Successful
project management can manifest itself both in the
systems engineering process and in the navigation of
university politics.
By far the most important factor in the success of a
university small satellite mission is schedule.
Timeline can become a high-risk item in university
settings because of issues like high and frequent
turnover rates, and student obligations like class and
internships. Successful student managers are able to
use timelines as motivation for the team while
avoiding both overstressing the team by pushing too
hard and allowing the timeline to slip by becoming
too lax. For example, successful managers have used
the launch manifestation process as motivation. UNP
finds launches on behalf of university teams and
works with the launch provider and the university
team to complete the launch integration process at a
certain point in the program’s timeline. Manifesting
too early causes overstrain, while manifesting too late
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perpetuates eternal hardware and software
development. By recognizing these risks and aiming
for an appropriate manifestation date, student
managers are able to renew motivation at the right
time during the verification and validation phases of
the project.
Another example of timeline management is the use
of student-enforced internal reviews. Because Phase
B is progress based, teams can potentially go long
durations (e.g., multiple years) without a formal UNP
review. Student managers that enforce internal
reviews are able to create intermediate milestones for
their team to work toward during those periods of
time. In this way, a university team is able to push its
schedule forward and combat the risk of losing too
much engineering knowledge by taking too long to
finish the spacecraft.
Regarding resource shortage, the development of a
university satellite lab requires the procurement of
specialized equipment and software, for example
ESD safe tools, thermal modelling software, and
oscilloscopes and other test equipment. Additionally,
a clean space is required in which to assemble a flight
unit of a spacecraft. Predictably, schools that already
have this type of lab infrastructure in place are
generally able to move through the mission lifecycle
more quickly than those that do not. New schools can
build up spacecraft development infrastructure by
varying sources of income while in the UNP
program.

every pitfall and heed every piece of advice presented
in this paper. However, awareness of these concepts
can help a school successfully develop a satellite
mission. Finally, it is emphasized that, regardless of
the mission outcome of each university’s smallsatellite program, the primary objective of the UNP is
education. We believe that any attempt made to build
a university small satellite imparts an invaluable
amount of knowledge and experience to the students
and should be supported and continued.
NOTES
1 – Quoted from the response of George Hunyadi of
DigitalGlobe.
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A final important factor related to project
management is the support given by the university
that houses a given small-satellite lab. Such support is
crucial not only to an individual mission but to the
long-term health of the lab itself. Primarily, lab space
and overall support for the endeavor are required for
the completion of the satellite and maintenance of the
lab. Such support that can be helpful includes base
funding, funding for the payment of students and
staff, and promotional support for recruiting
purposes. University labs that receive more support
are able to focus more on the completion of the
satellite and less on the sustainment of the base-level
resources they need in order to operate.
CONCLUSION
This paper discusses a set of lessons learned from 19
years of the University Nanosatellite Program, drawn
from the responses of surveys given to individuals
with a variety of relationships with the UNP. These
lessons are meant to inform university students, staff,
and faculty of some common concepts to watch out
for in their pursuit of completing a university small
satellite. Though, by its nature, this paper focuses on
traditional problem areas, the goal is not to
discourage any university from participating in the
UNP or similar programs. No school is able to avoid
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